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In this article I present a protocol for quantum cryptography which is secure against attacks
on individual signals. It is based on the Bennett-Brassard protocol of 1984 (BB84). The security
proof is complete as far as the use of single photons as signal states is concerned. Emphasis is given
to the practicability of the resulting protocol. For each run of the quantum key distribution the
security statement gives the probability of a successful key generation and the probability for an
eavesdropper’s knowledge, measured as change in Shannon entropy, to be below a specified maximal
value.
03.67.Dd, 03.65.Bz, 42.79.Sz
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Cryptography is a technique for generating and distributing cryptographic keys in which the secrecy of
the keys is guaranteed by quantum mechanics. The first such scheme was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984
(BB84 protocol) [1]. Sender and receiver (conventionally called Alice and Bob) use a quantum channel, which is
governed by the laws of quantum mechanics, and a classical channel which is postulated to have the property that
any classical message sent will be faithfully received. The classical channel will also transmit faithfully a copy of the
message to any eavesdropper, Eve. Along the quantum channel a sequence of signals is sent chosen at random from
two pairs of orthogonal quantum states. Each such pair spans the same Hilbert space. For example, the signals can
be realized as polarized photons: one pair uses horizontal and vertical linear polarization (+) while the other uses
linear polarization rotated by 45 degrees (×). Bob at random one of two measurements each performing projection
measurements on the basis + or ×. The sifted key [2] consists of the subset of signals where the bases of signal and
measurement coincide leading to deterministic results. This subset can be found by exchange of classical information
without revealing the signals themselves. Any attempt of an eavesdropper to obtain information about the signals
leads to a non-zero expected error rate in the sifted key and makes it likely that Alice and Bob can detect the
presence of the eavesdropper by comparing a subset of the sifted key over the public channel. If Alice and Bob find
no errors they conclude (within the statistical bounds of error detection) that no eavesdropper was active. They then
translate the sifted key into a sequence of zeros and ones which can be used, for example, as a one-time pad in secure
communication.
Several quantum cryptography experiments have been performed. In the experimental set-up noise is always present
leading to a bit error rate of, typically, 1 to 5 percent errors in the sifted key [3–6]. Alice and Bob can not even in
principle distinguish between a noisy quantum channel and the signature of an eavesdropper activity. The protocol of
the key distribution has therefore to be amended by two steps. The first is the reconciliation (or error correction) step
leading to a key shared by Alice and Bob. The second step deals with the situation that the eavesdropper now has to
be assumed to be in the possession of at least some knowledge about the reconciled string. For example, if one collects
some parity bits of randomly chosen subsets of the reconciled string as a new key then the Shannon information of
an eavesdropper on that new, shorter key can be brought arbitrarily close to zero by control of the number of parity
bits contributing towards it. This technique is the generalized privacy amplification procedure by Bennett, Brassard,
Cre´peau, and Maurer [7].
The final measure of knowledge about the key used in this article is that of change of Shannon entropy. If we assign
to each potential key x an a-priori probability p(x) then the Shannon entropy of this distribution is defined as
S [p(x)] = −
∑
x
p(x) log p(x) . (1)
Note that all logarithms in this article refer to basis 2. The knowledge Eve obtains on the key may be denoted by
k and leads to an a-posteriori probability distribution p(x|k). The difference between the Shannon entropy of the
a-priori and the a-posteriori probability distribution is a good measure of Eve’s knowledge:
∆S(k) = S [p(x)]− S [p(x|k)] . (2)
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For short, we will call ∆S(k) the entropy change. We recover the Shannon information as the expected value of that
difference as
IS = 〈∆S(k)〉 =
∑
k
p(k)∆S(k) (3)
where Eve’s knowledge k occurs with probability p(k). If we are able to give a bound on ∆S(k) for a specific run of the
quantum key distribution experiment then this is a stronger statement than a bound a the Shannon information: we
guarantee not only security on average but make a statement on a specific key, as required for secure communication.
The challenge for the theory of quantum cryptography is to provide a statement like the following one: If one
finds e errors in a sifted key of length nsif then, after error correction under an exchange of Nrec bits of redundant
information, a new key of length nfin can be distilled on which, with probability 1 − α, a potential eavesdropper
achieves an entropy change of less than ∆tol. Here ∆tol has to be chosen in view of the application for which the
secret key is used for. It is not necessary that each realization of a sifted key leads to a secret key; the realization
may be rejected with some probability β. In that case Alice and Bob abort the attempt and start anew.
The final goal is to provide the security statement taking into account the real experimental situation. For example,
no real channel exist which fulfill the axiom of faithfulness. There is the danger that an eavesdropper can separate
Alice and Bob and replace the public channel by two channels: one from Alice to Eve and another one from Eve to
Bob. In this separate world scenario Eve could learn to know the full key without causing errors. She could establish
different keys with Alice and Bob and then transfer effectively the messages from Alice to Bob. This problem can be
overcome by authentication [19]. This technique makes it possible for a receiver of a message to verify that the message
was indeed send by the presumed sender. It requires that sender and receiver share some secret knowledge beforehand.
It should be noted that it is not necessary to authenticate all individual messages sent along the public channel. It is
sufficient to authenticate some essential steps, including the final key, as indicated below. In the presented protocol,
successful authentication verifies at the same time that no errors remained after the key reconciliation. The need
to share a secret key beforehand to accomplish authentication reduces this scheme from a quantum key distribution
system to a quantum key growing system: from a short secret key we grow a longer secret key. On the other hand,
since one needs to share a secret key beforehand anyway, one can use part of it to control the flow of side-information
to Eve during the stage of key reconciliation in a new way. With side-information we mean any classical information
about the reconciled key leaking to the eavesdropper during the reconciliation.
Another problem is that in a real application we can not effectively create single photon states. Recent developments
by Law and Kimble [8] promise such sources, but present day experiments use dim coherent states, that is coherent
pulses with an expected photon number of typically 1/10 per signal. The component of the signal containing two or
more photon states, however, poses problems. It is known that an eavesdropper can, by the use of a quantum non-
demolition measurement of the total photon number and splitting of signals, learn with certainty all signals containing
more than one photon without causing any errors in the sifted key. If Eve can get hold of an ideal quantum channel
this will lead to the existence of a maximum value of loss in the channel which can be tolerated [9,10]. It is not known
at present whether this QND attack, possibly combined with attacks on the remaining single photons, is the optimal
attack but it is certainly pretty strong.
The eavesdropper is restricted in her power to interfere with the quantum signals only by quantum mechanics. In
the most general scenario, she can entangle the signals with a probe of arbitrary dimensions, wait until all classical
information is transmitted over the public channel, and then make a measurement on the auxiliary system to extract
as much information as possible about the key. Many papers, so far, deal only with single photon signals. At present
there exists an important claim of a security proof in this scenario by Mayers [11]. However, the protocol proposed
there is, up to now, far less efficient than the here proposed one. Other security proofs extend to a fairly wide class
of eavesdropping attacks, the coherent attacks [12].
In this paper I will give a solution to a restricted problem. The restriction consists of four points:
• The eavesdropper attacks each signal individually, no coherent or collective attacks take place.
• The signal states consist, indeed, of two pairs of orthogonal single photon states so that two states drawn from
different pairs have overlap probability 1/2.
• Bob uses detectors of identical detection efficiencies.
• The initial key shared by Alice and Bob is secret, that is the eavesdropper has negligible information about it.
Using the part of the key grown in a previous quantum key growing session is assumed to be safe in this sense.
Within these assumptions I give a procedure that leads with some a-priori probability β to a key shared by Alice and
Bob. If successful, the key is secure in the sense that with probability (1−α) any potential eavesdropper achieved an
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entropy change less than ∆tol. In contrast to all other work on this subject, this procedure takes into account that
the eavesdropper does not necessarily transmit single photons to the receiver; she might use multi-photon signals to
manipulate Bob’s detectors. The procedure presented here might not be optimal, but it is certifiable safe within the
four restrictions mentioned before.
It should be pointed out that coherent eavesdropping attacks are at present beyond our experimental capability.
Alice and Bob can increase the difficulty of the task of coherent or collective eavesdropping attacks by using random
timing for their signals (although here one has to be weary about the error rate of the key) or by delaying their
classical communication thereby forcing Eve to store her auxiliary probe system coherently for longer time. There is
an important difference between the threat of growing computer power against classical encryption techniques and
the growing power of experimental skills in the attack on quantum key distribution: while it is possible to decode
today’s message with tomorrow’s computer in classical cryptography, you can not use tomorrow’s experimental skills
in eavesdropping on a photon sent and detected today. It is seems therefore perfectly legal to put some technological
restrictions on the eavesdropper. This might be, for example, the restriction to attacks on individual system, or even
the restriction to un-delayed measurements. For the use of dim coherent states one might be tempted to disallow
Eve to use perfect quantum channels and to give her a minimum amount of damping of her quantum channel. The
ultimate goal, however, should be to be able to cope without those restrictions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section II I present the complete protocol on which the security analysis
is based. Then, in section III I discuss in more detail the various elements contributing to the protocol. The heart
of the security analysis is presented in section IV before I summarize in section V the efficiency and security of the
protocol.
II. HOW TO DO QUANTUM KEY GROWING
The protocol presented here is a suitable combination of the Bennett-Brassard protocol, reconciliation techniques
and authentication methods. I make use of the fact that Alice and Bob have to share some secret key beforehand.
Instead of seeing that as a draw-back, I make use of it to simplify the control of the side-information flow during
the classical data exchange. Side-information might leak to Eve in the form of parity bits, exchanged between Alice
and Bob during reconciliation, or in the form of knowledge that a specific bit was received correctly or incorrectly by
Bob. The side-information could be taken care of this during the privacy amplification step using the results of [13].
Here I present for clarity a new method to avoid any such side-information which correlates Eve’s information about
different bits (as parity bits do which are typically used in reconciliation) by using secret bits to encode some of the
classical communication.
The notation of the variables is guided by the idea that nx denotes numbers of bits, especially key length at various
stage, Nx denotes numbers of secure bits used in different steps of the protocol, βi denote probabilities of failing to
establish a shared key, αi denote failure probabilities critical to the safety of an established key, while γ denotes the
probability that Alice and Bob, unknown to themselves, do not even share a key. Quantities x or 〈x〉 denote expected
values of the quantity x.
The protocol steps and their achievements are:
1. Alice sends a sufficient number of signals to Bob to generate a sifted key of length nsif .
2. Bob notifies Alice in which time slot he received a signal.
3. Alice and Bob make a “time stamp” allowing them to make sure that the previous step has been completed
before they begin the next step. This can be done, for example, by taking the time of synchronized clocks after
step 2 and to include this time into the authentication procedure.
4. Alice sends the bases used for the signals marked in the second step to Bob.
5. Bob compares this information with his measurements and announces to Alice the elements of the generalized
sifted key of length nsif . The generalized sifted key is formed by two groups of signals. The first is the sifted
key of the BB84 protocol formed by all those signals which Bob can unambiguously interpret as a deterministic
measurement result of a single photon signal state. The second group consists of those signals which are
ambiguous as they can not be thought of as triggered by single photon signals. If two of Bob detectors (for
example monitoring orthogonal modes) are triggered, then this is an example of an ambiguous signal. The
number of these ambiguous signals is denoted by nD.
The announcement of this step has to be included into the authentication.
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6. Reconciliation: Alice sends, in total, Nrec encoded parity-check bits over the classical channel to Bob as a key
reconciliation. Bob uses these bits to correct or to discard the errors. During this step he will learn the actual
number of errors nerr. The probability that an error remains in the sifted key is given by β1. Depending on the
reconciliation scheme, Eve learns nothing in this step, or knows the position of the errors, or knows that Bob
received all the remaining bits correctly.
7. From the observed number of errors nerr and of ambiguous non-vacuum results nD Bob can conclude, using
a theorem by Hoeffding, that the expected disturbance measure ǫ =
〈
nerr+wDnD
nsif
〉
is, with probability 1 − α1,
below a suitable chosen upper bound ǫmax. With probability 1− β2 they find a value for α1 which allows them
to continue this protocol successfully. Here wD is a weight factor fixed later on.
8. Given the upper bound on the disturbance rate ǫmax, Alice and Bob shorten the key by a fraction τ during privacy
amplification such that the Shannon information on that final key is below I. The shortening is accomplished
using a hash function [19] chosen at random. To make a statement about the entropy change ∆S(k) Eve achieved
for this particular transmission they observe that this change is with probability 1 − α2 less than ∆tol. The
probability α2 can be estimated by α2 <
I
∆tol
.
9. In the last step Alice chooses at random a suitable hash function which she transmits encrypted to Bob using
Naut/2 secret bits. Then she hashes with that function her new key, the time from step 3, and the string of
bases from step 5 into a short sequence, called the authentication tag, The tag is sent to Bob who compares it
with the hashed version of his key. If no error was left after the error correction the tags coincide.This step is
repeated with the roles of Alice and Bob interchanged. If Bob detects an error rate too high to allow to proceed
with the protocol, he does not forward the correct authentication to Alice. The probability Eve could have
guessed the secret bits used by Alice or by Bob to encode their hashed message is given by α3. The probability
that a discrepancy between the two versions of the key remains undetected is denoted by γ.
The probability of detected failure is β with β < β1 + β2 and this failure does not compromise the security. In the
case of success Alice and Bob can now say that, at worst, with a probability of undetected failure (failure of security)
of α (with α < α1 + α2 + α3) the eavesdropper can achieve an entropy change for the final key which is bigger than
∆tol. The remaining probability γ describes the probability that Alice and Bob do not detect that they do not even
share a key.
Note that the final authentication is made symmetric so that no exchange of information over the success of that
step is necessary. Otherwise a party not comparing the authentication tags could regard the key as safe in a separate-
world scenario. More explanation about the authentication procedure can be found in section III E. The classical
information becoming available to Eve during the creation of the sifted key will be taken care of in the calculations
of section IV.
The public channel is now used for the following tasks:
• creation of the sifted key, where Eve learns which signals reached Bob and from which signal set each signal was
chosen from,
• transmission of encrypted parity check bits, on which Eve learns nothing,
• for bi-directional reconciliation methods: feedback concerning the success of parity bit comparisons (see following
section),
• for reconciliation methods which discard errors: the location of bits discarded from the key,
• announcement of the hash function chosen in this particular realization,
• transmission of the encrypted hash function for authentication and of the unencrypted authentication tags.
The main subject of this paper is to give the fraction τ by which the key has to be shortened to match the security
target as a function of the upper bound on the disturbance ǫmax. The estimation has to take care of all information
available to Eve by a combination of measurements on the quantum channel and classical information overheard
on the public channel. This classical information depends on the reconciliation procedure used. The nature of this
information might allow Eve to separate the signals into subsets of signals, for example those being formed by the
signals which are correctly (incorrectly) received by Bob, and to treat them differently.
The knowledge of the specific hash function is of no use to Eve in construction of her measurement on the signals.
This is a result of the assumption that Eve attacks each signal individually and that the knowledge of the hash
functions tells Eve only whether a specific bit will count towards the parity bit of a signal subset or not. She only will
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learn how important each individual bit is to her. If the bit is not used then it is too late to change the interaction
with that bit to avoid unnecessary errors, since the damage by interaction has been done long before. If it is used,
then Eve intends to get the best possible knowledge about it anyway. This situation might be different for scenarios
which allow coherent attacks.
III. ELEMENTS OF THE QUANTUM KEY GROWING PROTOCOL
In this section I explain in more detail the steps of the quantum key growing protocol. Special attention is given to
the security failure probabilities αi, limiting the security confidence of an established shared key, and to the failure
probabilities βi, limiting the capability to establish a shared key.
A. Generation of the generalized sifted key
Elements of the generalized sifted key are signals which either can be unambiguously interpreted as being determin-
isticly detected, given the knowledge of the polarization basis, or which trigger more than one detector. We think of
detection set-ups where detectors monitor one relevant mode each. Due to loss it is possible to find no photon in any
mode. Since Eve might use multi-photon signals we may find photons in different monitored modes simultaneously,
leading to ambiguous signals since more than one detector gives a click. Detection of several photons in one mode,
however, is deemed to be an unambiguous result. (See further discussion in section IVB.) In practice we will not be
able to distinguish between one or several photons triggering the detector. The length of the sifted key accumulated
in that way is kept fix to be of length nsif .
B. Reconciliation
For the reconciliation we have to distinguish two main classes of procedures: one class corrects the errors using
redundant information and the other class discards errors by locating error-free subsections of the sifted key. The class
of error-correcting reconciliation can be divided in two further subclasses: one subclass uses only uni-directional infor-
mation flow from Alice to Bob while the second subclass uses an interactive protocol with bi-directional information
flow.
The difference between the three approaches with respect to our protocol shows up in the number of secret bits they
need to reconcile the string, the length of the reconciled string, and the probability of success of reconciliation. For
experimental realization one should think as well of the practical implementation. For example, interactive protocols
are very efficient to implement [14]. To illustrate the difference I give examples for the error correction protocols.
The benchmark for efficiency of error correction is the Shannon limit. It gives the minimum number of bits which
have to be revealed about the correct version of a key to reconcile a version which is subjected to an error rate e.
This limit is achieved for large keys and the error correction probability approaches then unity. The Shannon limit is
given in terms of the amount of Shannon information IS(e) contained in the version of the key affected by the error
rate e. For a binary channel, as relevant in our case, this is given by
IS(e) = 1 + e log e+ (1− e) log(1− e) . (4)
The minimum number of bits needed, on average, to correct a key of length n affected by the error rate e is then
given by
nmin = n {1− IS(e)} . (5)
As mentioned before, perfect error correction is achievable only for n→∞.
1. Linear Codes for error correction.
Linear codes are a well-established technique which can be viewed in a standard-approach as attaching to each
k-bit signal a number of (n− k) bits of linearly independent parity-check bits making it in total a n-bit signal. The
receiver gets a noisy version of this n-bit signal and can now in a well-defined procedure find the most-likely k-bit
signal. Linear codes which will safely return the correct k-bit signal if up to f of the n bits were flipped by the noisy
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channel are denoted by [n, k, d] codes (with d = 2f + 1). If the signal is affected by more errors then these will be
corrected with less than unit probability.
This technique can be used for error correction. Alice and Bob partition their sifted key into blocks of size k. For
each block Alice computes the extra n− k parity bits, encodes them with secret bits and sends them via the classical
channel to Bob. Bob then corrects his block according to the standard error correction technique. This procedure
could be improved, since the [n, k, d] codes are designed to cope with the situation that even the parity bits might be
affected by noise. One can partly take advantage of the situation that these bits are transmitted correctly. However,
non-optimal performance is not a security hazard.
The search for an optimal linear code is beyond the scope of this paper. To illustrate the problem I present as
specific example the code [512, 422, 21]. It uses 90 redundant parity bits to protect a block of 422 bits against 10
errors. So how does this linear code perform if we use it to reconcile a string of nsif = 10128 bits which are affected
by an error rate of 1%? It can be shown that this string will be reconciled with a probability of (1 − β1) = 0.908 at
an expense of Nrec = 2160 secret bits. The practical implementation of a code as long as this one is, however, rather
problematic from the point of view of computational resources. In comparison, in the Shannon limit we need to use
819 bits for this task.
2. Interactive error correction
An interactive error correction code was presented by Brassard and Salvail in [14]. This code is reported to correct
a key with an error rate of 1% and length nsif = 10000 at an average expense of Nrec = 933 bits. No numbers for β1
are given, but in several tries no remaining error was found. This protocol operates acceptable close to the Shannon
limit which tells us that we need at least 808 bits to correct the key.
3. Situation after reconciliation
After reconciliation Alice and Bob share with probability (1 − β1) the same key. The eavesdropper gathered some
information from measurements on the quantum channel. The information she gained from listening to the public
channel puts her now into different positions depending on the reconciliation protocol. In case errors are discarded, she
knows that all remaining bits in the reconciled string were received correctly by Bob during the quantum transmission.
If an uni-directional error correction protocol is used, then listening to the public channel during reconciliation does
not give Eve any extra hints. The interactive error correction protocol, however, leaks some information to Eve about
the position of bits which were received incorrectly by Bob during the quantum protocol. We will have to take this
into account later on. There we take the view that Eve knows the positions of all errors exactly.
A difference between correcting and discarding errors is that, naturally, discarding errors will lead to a shorter
reconciled string of length nrec < nsif , while the length of the key does not change during error correction so that
nrec = nsif . Common to all schemes is that Alice and Bob know the precise number of errors which occurred (provided
the reconciliation worked). When they discard parts of the sifted key they can open up the discarded bits and learn
thereby the actual number of errors (although in this case an additional problem of authentication arises), and when
they correct errors Bob knows the number of bit-flips he performed during error correction. This is just the number
of errors of the sifted key.
Contrary to common belief it is therefore not necessary to sacrifice elements of the sifted key by public comparison
to determine or estimate the number of occurred errors.
C. Privacy amplification and the Shannon information on final key
In previous work it has been shown that for typical error rates in an experimental set-up the eavesdropper could
gain, on average, non-negligible amount of Shannon information on the reconciled key [15,16]. This means that we
can not use it as a secret key right away. Classical coding theory shows a way to distill a final secret key from the
reconciled key by the method of privacy amplification [7]. As a practical implementation of the hashing involved, the
secret key is obtained by taking nfin parity bits of randomly chosen subsets of the nrec bits of the reconciled string.
The choice of the random subsets is made only at that instance and changes for each repetition of the key growing
protocol. This shortening of the key to enhance the security of the final key is common to all other approaches that
deal with the security of quantum cryptography, for example by Mayers [11] or Biham et al [12]. However, it differs
the way to determine the fraction τ by which the key has to be shortened. In the case of individual eavesdropping
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attacks we can go via the collision probability as described below [7]. When we consider joint or collective attacks
it is not possible to take this approach due to correlation between the signals which possibly allows Eve to gain an
advantage by delaying her measurement until she learns to know the specific parity bits entering the final key.
In the first step we give the main formulas of privacy amplification and introduce the parameter τ1(ǫ). This
parameter indicates the fraction by which the key has to be shortened such that the expected eavesdropping information
on the final key is less than 1 bit of Shannon information. It is given as a function of Eve’s acquired collision
probability. Any additional bit by which the key is shortened leads to an exponential decrease of that expected
Shannon information.
We denote by z the final key of length nfin, by x the reconciled key of length nrec and by y the accumulated
knowledge of the eavesdropper due to her interaction with the signals and the overheard classical communication via
the public channel. We keep separately the hash function g which, for example, describes the subsets whose parity
bits form the final key. This hash function is part of Eve’s knowledge in each realization. Eve’s knowledge is expressed
in a probability distribution p(z|g, y), that is the probability that z is the key given Eve’s measurement results and
side-information on the key. In a trivial extension of the starting equation of [7] we find that the Shannon information
I˜, averaged over the hash functions, is bounded by
I ≡ 〈I˜〉g ≤ nfin + log〈pzc(g, y)〉y,g (6)
with the collision probability on the final key defined as pzc(g, y) =
∑
z p
2(z|g, y). The collision probability 〈pzc(g, y)〉g
on the final key, averaged with respect to g, is bounded by the collision probability pxc (y) =
∑
x p
2(x|y) on the
reconciled key as
〈pzc(g, y)〉g < 2−nfin (2nfinpxc (y) + 1) . (7)
This can be trivially extended to an inequality for 〈pzc(g, y)〉y,g resulting in
〈pc(g, y)〉g,y < 2−nfin (2nfin〈pxc (y)〉y + 1) . (8)
This allows us to give the estimate
I ≤ log (2nfin〈pxc (y)〉y + 1) (9)
bounding the eavesdropper’s expected Shannon information by her expected collision probability on the sifted key
and the length of the final key.
We can reformulate the estimate (9) by introducing the fraction τ1. If we shorten the reconciled key by this fraction
then Eve’s expected Shannon information is just one bit on the whole final key. Therefore we find
τ1 = 1 +
1
nrec
log〈pxc (y)〉y . (10)
We introduce the security parameter nS as the number of bits by which the final key is shorter than prescribed by
the fraction τ1. This security parameter nS is implicitly defined by
nfin = (1 − τ1) nrec − nS . (11)
With the definitions of τ1 and nS we then find [7]
I ≤ log(2−nS + 1) ≈ 2
−nS
ln 2
. (12)
From this relation we see that the total amount of Eve’s expected Shannon information on the final key decreases
exponentially with the security parameter nS . The main part of this paper will be to estimate 〈pxc (y)〉y for various
scenarios as a function of the expected disturbance rate ǫ to estimate τ1 and with that to estimate I as a function ǫ.
D. From expected quantities to specific quantities
In the previous section we showed that once we know the expected disturbance rate ǫ and the functional dependence
of τ1(ǫ), we can estimate the eavesdropper’s Shannon information I on the final key in dependence of nS via equation
(12). In this section we now show how to link the observed error rate to the expected error rate and how to estimate
the entropy change ∆S in a single run from the expected Shannon information I.
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1. From the measured error rate to the expected error rate
Alice and Bob establish a generalized sifted key of length nsif . During reconciliation of the sifted key Bob learns
the actual number of errors nerr of unambiguous signals while he already knows the number nD of ambiguous signals.
Our definition of disturbance is here
ǫ =
nerr + wDnD
nrec
(13)
with wD as adjustable weight parameter for ambiguous signals to be chosen in a suitable way. We will present in
section IVG a model for which we can choose wD = 1/2. In the case of error correction we have to correct even the
ambiguous signals to keep the number nsif fixed and to keep control about the disturbance. The reason is we need
to formulate a measure of disturbance per element of the reconciliated key which is bounded. This is possible for
correction of errors. In the case of discarding errors the number of errors and ambiguous results per remaining bit is
unbounded and we fail to be able to give a bound on ǫ from the measured values.
Therefore we restrict ourselves to the case of corrected errors where we find the length nrec of the reconciled string
to be equal to the length nsif of the generalized sifted key. In this situation the measured disturbance is given by
ǫmeas =
nerr+wDnD
nsif
. Since nsif is kept fixed the expected disturbance is given by ǫ =
〈nerr+wDnD〉
nsif
. From the measured
value ǫmeas we estimate the average disturbance parameter ǫ.
To make the role of ǫ clear it should be pointed out that any given eavesdropping strategy will lead to an expected
error probability ǫ while the actually caused and observed error rate can be much lower for an individual run of the
protocol. For example, think of an intercept/resend protocol as in [10] where Eve has her lucky day and measures,
by chance, all signals in the appropriate bases. This is not very likely, but the treatment presented here takes care of
this possibility.
In an application of a theorem by Hoeffding [17], which has been used already in [12], we find an estimate of the
number 〈nerr + wDnD〉 from the actually measured number nerr + wDnD for a total number of nsif signals as
〈nerr + wDnD〉 < nerr + wDnD + nsifδ (14)
with probability
(1− α1) > 1− exp(−2nsifδ2) (15)
as long as wD ≤ 1. For wD ≥ 1 we have to replace equation (15) by (1 − α1) > 1 − exp(− 2nsifδ
2
w2
D
). This means that
we can give a bound on the expected disturbance parameter ǫ from the observed quantities nD and nerr within a
certain confidence limit. To give a numeric example we choose wD = 1/2 (see section IVG) and refer to the situation
reported by Marand and Townsend [3]. There an experiment is presented which can create a sifted key of length
nsif = 1.4 × 10−3n from an exchange of n quantum signals at an error rate of 1.2% with a negligible amount of
ambiguous signals. Then the choice of δ = 0.038 and a sampling with n = 107 leads to a reconciled key of length
nsif = 1.4 × 104 with a value of α1 ≈ 10−18. This is the probability that the expected disturbance parameter ǫ in
a typical realization of the key transfer is less than a maximal value of ǫmax = 0.05. The value ǫmax will be used in
privacy amplification. An eye has to be kept on the sampling time. With the experiment described in [3] it will take
about 10 seconds to establish the sifted key. An example for smaller samples is the choice of n = 105 and δ = 0.4 which
leads for the same system to a reconciled key of length nsif = 140 and α1 ≈ 10−19, ǫmax = 0.412. The probability β2
to fail to achieve a satisfactory level of confidence at this stage is in most cases negligible in comparison to the failure
of reconciliation. It should be noted that these numbers give a rough guidance only, since the experiment does not
use single-photon signals.
2. Expected information and information in specific realization
We still need to link the change of Shannon entropy ∆S on the final key in an individual realization of the protocol
with a given probability to the Shannon information I, that is over the average over many realizations. The key is
thought of as unsafe if the eavesdropper achieves an entropy change bigger than ∆tol in a specific realization. This
happens at most with probability α2 which is bounded implicitly by I > α2∆tol leading to
α2 <
I
∆tol
=
log(2−nS + 1)
∆tol
≈ 2
−nS
∆tol ln 2
(16)
So the knowledge of an estimate for I and the prescription of an acceptable value of ∆tol gives us the probability
1− α2 of secrecy of the key.
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E. Authentication
The tools of the previous sections allow Alice and Bob to construct a common secret key provided that their classical
channel is faithful. Since channels with that property, as such, do not exist, we need to authenticate the procedure
to make sure that Alice and Bob actually share the new key. Authentication can protect at the same time against
errors which survived the reconciliation step and against an eavesdropping attack with a “separate world” approach.
It is essential to make sure that Eve has no influence on the choice of bits entering the generalized sifted key
exceeding the power to manipulate the quantum channel. The time-stamp step 3 in the protocol assures us that there
is no point in Eve faking the public discussion up to that point since she gained no additional information about the
signals so far, especially no information about the polarization basis.
The following sequence of bases for the successful received signals sent from Alice and Bob does not need to
be authenticated as well since Eve can not bar corresponding signals from the sifted key without knowing Bob’s
measurements as well. However, the message describing which bits finally form the generalized sifted key needs to be
authenticated since Eve is now in the position to bar signals from the sifted key she shares with Alice by manipulation
of the contents of the message [18].
The subsequent reconciliation protocol need not to be authenticated if we authenticate the final key. The reason
for that is that the previous steps fixed the reconciled key as the generalized sifted key in Alice’s version. If Eve
tampers with the reconciliation protocol then Bob will fail correct his key so that it becomes equal to Alice’s key.
Authentication of the final key will therefore be sufficient to protect against tampering with the public channel in this
step. It doubles at the same time to protect against incomplete reconciliation.
To summarize, we need to authenticate the string identifying the elements of the sifted key within the received
signals, the time stamp, and the final key. The length of this string is roughly m ≈ 2nsif . The authentication is done
in the following way which is based on the authentication procedure of Wegman and Carter [19]:
Alice chooses a hash-function of approximate length Naut/2 = 4t logm and sends it encrypted to Bob. Both evaluate
the hashed version of the message, the tag, of length t. Alice sends the tag via the public channel to Bob. If the tags
coincide then this step is repeated with the role of Alice and Bob interchanged. With this symmetric scheme we make
sure that neither Alice nor Bob can be coaxed into a position where they think that authentication succeeded when
it in fact failed. The probability that Eve could fake the authentication is given by
α3 = 2
−t+1 . (17)
This is at the same time the probability that two distinct final keys lead to the same hashed key. Any remaining error
in the final key will therefore lead with probability 1− α3 to a failure of the authentication.
IV. EXPECTED COLLISION PROBABILITY AND EXPECTED ERROR RATE
This section represents the major input of physics to the quantum key growing protocol. The aim is to put an upper
bound on the expected average collision probability Eve obtains on the reconciliated key as a function of an average
disturbance rate her eavesdropping strategy inflicted on the signals. This is done for two methods of reconciliation,
correcting or deleting errors. The result will allow us to give values for the parameter τ1(ǫ).
A. Collision probability on individual signal
The collision probability on the reconciled key is defined by
pxc (y) =
∑
x
p2(x|y) . (18)
We assume that the signal sent by Alice are statistically independent of each other and Eve interacts with and performs
measurements on each bit individually. Furthermore, we avoid side-information which correlates signals by the use
of secret bits in the reconciliation step. Therefore the conditional probability function p(x|y) for x being the key
given Eve’s knowledge y factorises into a product of probabilities for each signal. With that the expected collision
probability factorises as well into a product of the expected collision probability for each bit. We denote by pxc the
expected collision probability on one bit so that
〈pxc (g, y)〉y = (pxc )nrec
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Furthermore, we denote by the index α ∈ {+,×} the two conjugate bases (e.g. horizontal or vertical polarization for
single photons) used to encode the signals, by Ψ ∈ {0, 1} the logical values, and by k the possible outcomes of Eve’s
measurement. This leads to an expression of the expected collision probability, at this stage, as
pxc =
∑
k,Ψ,α
p2(Ψα, kα)
p(kα)
. (19)
We find for the parameter τ1 describing the shortening of the key during privacy amplification from eqn. (10)
τ1 = log(2p
x
c ) . (20)
B. Eve’s interaction and detection description
The action of the eavesdropper can be described by a completely positive map [20,21] acting on the signal density
matrices ρ as
ρ˜ =
∑
k
AkρA
†
k (21)
where we can associate this interaction with a measurement by Eve of a Probability Operator Measure (POM) formed
by the operators Fk = A
†
kAk. The operators Ak are arbitrary operators mapping the Hilbert space of the signals to an
arbitrary Hilbert space. The only restriction is that
∑
k A
†
kAk gives the identity operator of the signal Hilbert space.
The probability for occurrence of outcome k is then given by p(k) = Tr(ρFk). The action of Bob’s detectors can be
described by a POM on the resulting Hilbert space after Eve’s interaction. Since the detection POM elements and
the signal density operators can be represented by real matrices, we can assume the operators Ak to be represented
by real matrices as well.
This does not limit the generality of the approach, since the outcome corresponding to an operator Ak = A
re
k +
iAimk , with real operators A
re
k and A
im
k , is triggered with probability Tr(ρA
re
k
†Arek ) + Tr(ρA
im
k
†
Aimk ) and the outcome
probabilities for Bob’s detection, corresponding to POM element F if outcome k of Eve’s measurement is being
triggered, is given by Tr(Arek ρA
re
k
†F ) + Tr(Arek ρA
re
k
†F ). Since no cross-terms mixing Arek and A
im
k occur this means
that using the two real operators Arek and A
im
k , instead of Ak = A
re
k + iA
im
k , will not change the outcome probabilities
of Bob’s detectors but refines Eve’s measurement.
Two typical detection set-ups are shown in figure 1. The active version consists of a polarization analyzer (two
detectors monitoring each an output of a polarizing beam-splitter) and a phase shifter which effectively changes the
polarization basis of the subsequent measurement. Here one has actively to choose the polarization basis of the
measurement. The passive device uses two polarization analyzers, one for each basis, and uses a beam-splitter to split
the incoming signal the two polarization analyzers are used with equal probability for detection.
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FIG. 1. (a) Active device: Bob’s two detectors consist each of a polarizing beam splitter and an ideal detector. The
polarizing beam splitter discriminates the two orthogonal linear polarized modes. Using a polarization shifter the polarization
basis can be changed as desired. Detector efficiencies are modeled by a beam splitter which represents the loss and which
is thought of as being part of the eavesdropper’s strategy. This beam splitter can be seen as part of the quantum channel.
(b) Passive device: Here one uses two detection modules as presented in (a), one for each polarization basis. The central
beam-splitter takes the task to “switch” between the two polarization analyzers.
One can represent the detectors by beam-splitters combined with ideal detectors [22]. Then the beam-splitters
can be thought to be responsible for the finite efficiency. Since all detectors are assumed to be equal, the losses of
all detectors involved can be attributed to a single loss beam-splitter, which is then thought of as being part of the
transmission channel rather than being part of the detection unit.
We can use the idea of ideal detectors which measure each a POM with two elements, the projection operator onto
the vacuum (no “click”) and the projection on the Fock-subspaces with at least one photon (“click”). The POM of
the active and the passive set-up then contains the elements Fvac, F0+ , F1+ , F0× , F1× , FD. These are projections
onto the vacuum, Fvac, onto states with at least one photon in one of the four signal polarizations and none in the
others, therefore leading to an unambiguous result, FΨα , and onto the rest of the Hilbert space, that is onto all states
containing at least one photon in the signal polarization and at least one in an orthogonal mode FD. The first POM
outcome manifests itself in no detector click at all, the following four give precisely one detector click, and the last one
gives rise to at least two detectors being triggered. If we denote by |n,m〉α the state which has n photons in one mode
and m photons in the orthogonal polarization mode with respect to the polarization basis α, use the abbreviation
E(0) for the projector onto the vacuum and E
(n)
Ψα
for the projector onto the state with n photons in the polarization
mode corresponding to Ψα, then the POM of detection unit (a) is given by
Fvac = E
(0) (22)
FΨα =
1
2
∞∑
n=1
E
(n)
Ψα
FD =
1
2
∞∑
n,m=1
|n,m〉+〈n,m|+ 1
2
∞∑
n,m=1
|n,m〉×〈n,m| .
On the other hand, the passive detection scheme (b) is more susceptible to signals containing more than one photon.
It is described by the POM
Fvac = E
(0) (23)
FΨα =
∞∑
n=1
(
1
2
)n
E
(n)
Ψα
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FD =
∞∑
n=1

(1
2
−
(
1
2
)n)∑
Ψ,α
E
(n)
Ψ,α


+
1
2
∞∑
n,m=1
|n,m〉+〈n,m|+ 1
2
∞∑
n,m=1
|n,m〉×〈n,m| .
The next idea concerns all detection set-ups where all elements of the POM commute with the projections En
onto the subspaces of total photon number n. In that case we find that Bob’s measurement on the final signal gives
outcome i ∈ {vac,Ψα, D} with probability
PBob(i) := Tr(
∑
k
AkρA
†
kFi) = Tr(
∑
k,n
EnAkρA
†
kEnFi)
We can now replace the set of Ak’s by the set An,k := EnAk which still describes Eve measurement but for which each
element maps the Hilbert space of the signals to a Hilbert space with a fixed photon number. Eve will now associate
a POM element of her measurement with each such An,k thereby refining her POM and leading to an increase of her
knowledge. For short we write again Ak for this set, for which now the property is assumed that the signal arriving
at Bob’s detection unit is an eigenstate of the total photon number operator. We can divide the index set K of k
into subsets K(n) so that for each k ∈ K(n) the operator Ak maps the one-photon Hilbert space of the signal into the
n-photon space. This is useful to distinguish contributions of signals with different photon number.
We still have to discuss how to represent a delayed measurement in this picture. A delayed measurement is
performed in the way that Eve brings an auxiliary system into contact with the signal so that they evolve together
under a controlled unitary evolution. Then the signal is measured by Bob while Eve delays the measurement of
her auxiliary system until she has received all classical information exchanged over the public channel. Having this
knowledge, she picks the optimal measurement to be performed on her auxiliary system. Classical information useful
to Eve is information that allows her to divide the signals into subsets which should experience different treatment.
In our situation this information is represented by the polarization basis of the signal and, for bi-directional error
correction, by the knowledge whether the signal was received correctly by Bob. We have therefore to assume, for
example, that Eve’s delayed measurement is characterized by the set of operators Ak with k ∈ K, giving rise to Eve’s
POM Fk = AkA
†
k, and which are applied to the signals from the set α = “+” and a second set Bk′ with k
′ ∈ K ′,
resulting in the POM F ′k′ = Bk′B
†
k′ , which are applied to the signals from the set α = “×”. Of course, these two sets
of operators can not be chosen arbitrarily. The complete positive map has to be identical for all density matrices ρ,
that is
ρ˜ =
∑
k∈K
AkρA
†
k =
∑
k′∈K′
Bk′ρB
†
k′ . (24)
Moreover, this equality holds even for non-Hermitian matrices ρ. We can combine this result with the partition into
n-photon subspaces. Then we find that even the stronger statement∑
k∈K(n)
AkρA
†
k =
∑
k′∈K′(n)
Bk′ρB
†
k′ . (25)
holds. Before we go on to the derivation of the relation between average disturbance and average collision probability
I would like to point out that this treatment takes into account the rich structure of modes supported by optical
fibers and the fact that detectors monitor a multitude of modes. As long as the detection POM commutes with the
projector onto the actually used signal mode, which is usually the case, we can separate the action of the Ak with
respect to the photon number in a similar way.
C. Separation into n-photon contributions
In this section we are going to present the disturbance measure ǫ and the collision probability pxc as sums over
contributions with different definite photon number n arriving at Bob’s detector unit. We start from the definition of
the disturbance ǫ. To allow some comparison between correcting and discarding errors, we present a unified definition
which defines, even for discarded errors, a disturbance measure per bit of the reconciled key. This definition is given
by
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ǫ =
nerr + wDnD
nrec
. (26)
Here nerr is the number of errors in the sifted key, nD is the number of ambiguous results occurring and nrec is the
number of bits in the reconciled string. The weight parameter wD for ambiguous signals will be fixed later on. If we
keep the size of the reconciled key fixed, then the expectation value of ǫ is described by
ǫ =
perr + wDpD
prec
(27)
where perr, pD, prec are the absolute probabilities that a signal will, respectively, enter the sifted key as error, cause
an ambiguous result, or become an element of the reconciled key. As mentioned before, it should be noted, that no
estimate ǫ from measured data can be easily presented in the case of discarded errors. We separate the contributions
from the different photon number signals as
ǫ =
∑
n
p
(n)
rec
prec
p
(n)
err + wDp
(n)
D
p
(n)
rec
=
∑
n
p
(n)
rec
prec
ǫ(n) . (28)
where we have implicitly defined
ǫ(n) =
p
(n)
err + wDp
(n)
D
p
(n)
rec
(29)
as the n-photon contribution towards the disturbance measure. Now p
(n)
X are the conditional probabilities that a signal
has property X while being transfered as n-photon signal between Eve and Bob. The total disturbance is given as
sum over the n-photon contribution weighted by the relative probability that a signal arriving as an n-photon signal
at Bob’s detector will enter the reconciled key.
If we discard errors, then we find for the relevant probabilities (with Ψ as the complement to binary value Ψ)
p(n)err =
1
4
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,α,
Tr
(
AkρΨαA
†
kF
(n)
Ψα
)
(30)
p(n)rec =
1
4
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,α,
Tr
(
AkρΨαA
†
kF
(n)
Ψα
)
(31)
p
(n)
D =
1
4
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,α,
Tr
(
AkρΨαA
†
kF
(n)
D
)
. (32)
If we correct errors, then the probability for a signal to enter the reconciled key differs from equation (31) and is,
instead, given by
p(n)rec =
1
4
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,α,Ψ′
Tr
(
AkρΨ′αA
†
kF
(n)
Ψα
)
(33)
=
1
4
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,α
Tr
(
AkA
†
kF
(n)
Ψα
)
.
The collision probability is split into contributions related to fixed photon numbers arriving at Bob’s detector in the
same manner as the disturbance measure to give
pxc =
∞∑
n=1
p
(n)
rec
prec
p(n)c (34)
with
p(n)c :=
∑
k∈K(n),Ψ,α
1
p
(n)
rec
p2(Ψα, kα)
p(kα)
.
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The basic idea is now to estimate the one-photon contributions to these quantities and then to choose wD in such a
way that the optimal eavesdropping strategy will necessarily employ only one-photon signals. To achieve this we will
use the fact that multi-photon signals lead unavoidably to ambiguous signals, that is p
(n)
D 6= 0 for n > 2 when using
the passive detection option.
D. The one-photon contribution for discarded errors
We use the description of the general eavesdropping strategy to calculate the one-photon contributions. We find
with the help of the identity F
(1)
Ψα
= 12ρΨα
p(1)c =
1
8
∑
k∈K(1)
1
p
(1)
rec


Tr2
(
Akρ0+A
†
kρ0+
)
+Tr2
(
Akρ1+A
†
kρ1+
)
Tr
(
Akρ0+A
†
kρ0+
)
+Tr
(
Akρ1+A
†
kρ1+
)

 (35)
+
1
8
∑
k′∈K′(1)
1
p
(1)
rec


Tr2
(
Bk′ρ0×B
†
k′ρ0×
)
+Tr2
(
Bk′ρ1×B
†
k′ρ1×
)
Tr
(
Bk′ρ0×B
†
k′ρ0×
)
+Tr
(
Bk′ρ1×B
†
k′ρ1×
)


and with the relation between p
(1)
rec and ǫ(1) from eqn. (29), and p
(1)
sif = p
(1)
err + p
(1)
rec we find
p(1)rec =
p
(1)
sif
1 + ǫ(1)
(36)
together with the quantities
p(1)rec =
1
8
∑
k∈K(1)
Ψ,α
{
Tr
(
AkρΨαA
†
kρΨα
)}
(37)
p
(1)
sif =
1
4
∑
k∈K(1)
Tr
(
AkA
†
k
)
. (38)
The equations (35–38) form the basis for the following calculations. To start with, we decrease the number of free
parameters to a handful of real parameters, so that we can optimize Eve’s strategy to give an upper bound on p
(1)
c
as a function of ǫ(1). To do so, we take a new look at the complete positive mapping (21). We define four vectors
A00,A10,A01,A11 with the components k ∈ K(1) given by
AkΨ,Ψ′ = 〈Ψ+|Ak|Ψ′+〉 . (39)
These vectors are formed by the transition amplitudes from the signal states to the one-photon detection states for
each different measurement outcome. They effectively describe not only the complete channel between Alice and Bob
but also the complete eavesdropping strategy. With these vectors we can simplify the notation of the expectation
values introducing vector products∑
k∈K(1)
Tr
(
AkρΨ+A
†
kρΨ′+
)
= AΨ,Ψ′AΨ,Ψ′ = |AΨ,Ψ′ |2 .
Similarly we can define vectors B00,B10,B01,B11 and vectors B˜00, B˜10, B˜01, B˜11 with elements for k
′ ∈ K ′(1)
Bk
′
Ψ,Ψ′ = 〈Ψ+|B′k|Ψ′+〉 (40)
B˜k
′
Ψ,Ψ′ = 〈Ψ×|B′k|Ψ′×〉 . (41)
These vectors are not independent. They are related by the identities
14
B˜00 =
1
2
(B00 −B10 −B01 +B11) (42)
B˜01 =
1
2
(B00 −B10 +B01 −B11)
B˜10 =
1
2
(B00 +B10 −B01 −B11)
B˜11 =
1
2
(B00 +B10 +B01 +B11)
The advantage of this description is that the value of any scalar product of the vectors BΨ,Ψ′ remains unchanged
if the BΨ,Ψ′ ’s are replaced by AΨ,Ψ′ ’s since (25) guarantees that
BΨ,Ψ′Bφ,φ′ = AΨ,Ψ′Aφ,φ′ . (43)
The idea is now to estimate and reformulate the equations (35–38) in such a way that the new set of equations involve
only the four vectors A00,A10,A01,A11 and the quantities ǫ
(1), p
(1)
sif and p
(1)
rec. As a first step we find from eqn. (35)
p(1)c =
1
8p
(1)
rec
∑
k∈K(1)
(Ak00)
4 + (Ak11)
4
(Ak00)
2 + (Ak11)
2
(44)
+
1
8p
(1)
rec
∑
k′∈K′(1)
(B˜k
′
00)
4 + (B˜k
′
11)
4
(B˜k
′
00)
2 + (B˜k
′
11)
2
,
while equation (36) remains unchanged
p(1)rec =
p
(1)
sif
1 + ǫ(1)
. (45)
The definitions of p
(1)
rec and ǫ
(1) simplify to
p(1)rec =
1
8
(
|A00|2 + |A11|2 + |B˜00|2 + |B˜11|2
)
(46)
p
(1)
sif =
1
4
(|A00|2 + |A11|2 + |A01|2 + |A10|2) . (47)
Next we use the Cauchy inequality as shown in appendix A to estimate p
(1)
c by an expression involving only scalar
products of the basic vectors. With use of the definition of p
(1)
rec this results in the expression
p(1)c ≤ 1 (48)
− 1
4prec
(A00A11)
2
|A00|2 + |A11|2 −
1
4prec
(
B˜00B˜11
)2
|B˜00|2 + |B˜11|2
.
We find that there are actually only a few real quantities left. These are |A00|, |A11|, the angle φ1100 between A00 and
A11, |A01|2+ |A10|2, |A01+A10|2, psif and, finally, ǫ(1). The normalization factor p(1)rec can be immediately eliminated.
As shown in appendix B we can optimize p
(1)
c and find the result
p(1)c ≤
{
1
2
(
1 + 4ǫ(1) − 4 (ǫ(1))2) for ǫ(1) ≤ 1/2
1 for ǫ(1) ≥ 1/2
. (49)
To compare this result with other results we introduce the error rate e in the sifted key as e =
p(1)err
p
(1)
sif
(so that ǫ(1) = e1−e )
and we find
p(1)c ≤
1 + 2e− 7e2
2 (1− e)2 . (50)
This upper bound was given before in [23,24] for the case that Eve performed non-delayed measurements. Recently
Slutsky et al. [25,26] have found that this bound holds even for the delayed case. My formulation of that proof shows
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that this bound is valid not only for the one-photon contribution but can be extended to include the full Hilbert space
of optical fibers and detectors accessible to Eve in real experiments.
From [23,24,26] we know that this bound is sharp since the eavesdropping strategy achieving this bound is given
explicitly. It is a translucent attack. An important property of this bound is that for a disturbance rate of ǫ(1) = 12
(or error rate e = 13 ) the eavesdropping attempt is so successful that each bit of the sifted key originating from this
part of the eavesdropping strategy is known with unit probability by Eve.
E. The one-photon contribution for corrected errors
If we correct errors without leaking knowledge about their position to the eavesdropper, then the one photon
contribution to the collision probability is given by
p(1)c = (51)
1
8p
(n)
sif
∑
k∈K(1)
Tr2(ρ0+A
†
kAk) + Tr
2(ρ1+A
†
kAk)
Tr(A†kAk)
+
1
8p
(n)
sif
∑
k′∈K′(1)
Tr2(ρ0×B
†
k′Bk′) + Tr
2(ρ1×B
†
k′Bk′ )
Tr(B†k′Bk′)
.
(Note that p
(1)
rec = p
(1)
sif .) The disturbance parameter coincides with the error rate e
(1) in the sifted key and is given by
ǫ(1) =
p
(1)
err
p
(1)
sif
(52)
with
psif =
1
4
(|A00|2 + |A11|2 + |A01|2 + |A10|2) (53)
=
1
4
(
|B˜00|2 + |B˜11|2 + |B˜01|2 + |B˜10|2
)
perr = (54)
psif − 1
8
(
|A00|2 + |A11|2 + |B˜00|2 + |B˜11|2
)
.
In appendix C I show that the collision probability in this case can be estimated by
p(1)c ≤


1
2 + 3ǫ
(1) − 5 (ǫ(1))2 for ǫ(1) ≤ 1/4
3
4 + ǫ
(1) − (ǫ(1))2 for 1/4 ≤ ǫ(1) ≤ 1/2
1 for 1/2 ≤ ǫ(1)
. (55)
This estimate is not necessarily sharp, but it is good enough for practical purposes. It shows that τ1 = 1 for an
error rate of ǫ = 1/2, which corresponds to a strategy which intercepts and stores all signals while random signals are
resent. By delaying the measurement of the signals Eve thus knows all signals while causing a disturbance of 1/2.
F. One-photon contribution for corrected errors with leaked error positions
If Alice and Bob use a bi-directional error correction scheme then Eve will gain some knowledge about the positions
of the errors. She can therefore divide the signals into subsets characterized by Eve’s measurement outcome k, the
polarization basis α of the signal and the correctness of the signal reception of Bob. We therefore need to introduce
new operators CkΨΨ′ and D˜
k
ΨΨ′ to describe the eavesdropping strategy applied to incorrectly received signals. They are
formed analogous to AkΨΨ′ and B˜
k
ΨΨ′ respectively. Then the one-photon contribution towards the collision probability
is given by
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p(1)c =
1
8p
(1)
sif
∑
k∈K(1)
(Ak00)
4 + (Ak11)
4
(Ak00)
2 + (Ak11)
2
(56)
+
1
8p
(1)
sif
∑
k′∈K′(1)
(B˜k
′
00)
4 + (B˜k
′
11)
4
(B˜k
′
00)
2 + (B˜k
′
11)
2
(57)
+
1
8p
(1)
sif
∑
k∈K(1)
(Ck01)
4 + (Ck10)
4
(Ck01)
2 + (Ck10)
2
(58)
+
1
8p
(1)
sif
∑
k′∈K′(1)
(D˜k
′
01)
4 + (D˜k
′
10)
4
(D˜k
′
01)
2 + (D˜k
′
10)
2
.
The disturbance ǫ(1), psif and perr are defined as in eqns. (52) to (54) where we note that within scalar products like
equation (43) the vectors C (D˜) can be replaced by A (B˜). In appendix D I show that
p(1)c ≤
{
1
2 + 2ǫ
(1) − 2 (ǫ(1))2 for ǫ(1) ≤ 1/2
1 for 1/2 ≤ ǫ(1) . (59)
As it is the case if the error positions are not known to Eve, this estimate is not necessarily sharp. This is due to the
use of the Cauchy inequality during the estimation. It shows a behavior analogous to that of equation (55) that for
an error rate of e = 1/2 (and disturbance rate ǫ = 1/2) we find τ1(1/2) = 1 which means that Eve knows the whole
key.
G. Multi-photon signals between Eve and Bob
To deal with multi-photon signals we have to pick a detection model. We will concentrate here on the passive
detection scheme to choose wD such that it is disadvantageous for Eve to use multi-photon signals. In my thesis [23]
I have shown that even for active switching between two polarization analyzer with different polarization orientation
one can show security against eavesdropping strategies employing multi-photon signals.
The crucial observation for the passive detection unit is that sending multi-photon signals will invariably cause the
outcome associated with FD to appear with a finite probability. This means that we can choose the weight factor
wD such that ǫ
(n) > ǫ(1) holds for n ≥ 2. As a consequence the optimal eavesdropping strategy will employ only
single-photon signals. The contribution of ambiguous signals to the disturbance parameter ǫ(n) for discarded errors is
bounded by a rough estimate obtained with help of eqn. (23) by omission of suitable positive terms in the expression
for FD
p
(n)
D
p
(n)
rec
=
1
4
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,α
Tr(AkρΨαA
†
kFD)
1
4
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,α
Tr
(
AkρΨαA
†
kF
(n)
Ψα
) (60)
≥
1
4
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,α
(
1
2 − 2−n
)
Tr
(
AkρΨαA
†
kE
(n)
Ψα
)
2−n 14
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,α
Tr
(
AkρΨαA
†
kE
(n)
Ψα
)
=
(
1
2 − 2−n
)
2−n
≥ 1 .
The contribution of ambiguous signals to the disturbance parameter ǫ(n) for corrected errors is bounded in the same
way as
p
(n)
D
p
(n)
sif
=
1
4
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,α
Tr(AkρΨαA
†
kFD)
1
4
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,Ψ′,α
Tr
(
AkρΨαA
†
kF
(n)
Ψ′α
) (61)
≥
1
4
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,Ψ′,α
(
1
2 − 2−n
)
Tr
(
AkρΨαA
†
kE
(n)
Ψ′α
)
2−n 14
∑
k∈K(n)
Ψ,Ψ′,α
Tr
(
AkρΨαA
†
kE
(n)
Ψ′α
)
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=
1
4
(
1
2 − 2−n
)
2−n 14
≥ 1 .
One can find lower values of wD estimating the expression for ǫ
(n) as a whole including the errors in the sifted key.
However, the values found here serve our purposes well enough.
For correcting and for discarding errors, we find that a disturbance parameter ǫ = 1/2 means that Eve knows
the whole key using one-photon signals. Therefore, if we choose wD =
1
2 we obtain ǫ
(n) ≥ wD p
(n)
D
p
(n)
rec
≥ 12 and ǫ(n) ≥
wD
p
(n)
D
p
(n)
sif
≥ 12 respectively and can bound the collision probability, taking into account the possibility of multi-photon
signals, for discarded errors by
τ1(ǫ) ≤
{
log
(
1 + 4ǫ− 4ǫ2) for ǫ ≤ 1/2
1 for 1/2 ≤ ǫ , (62)
for corrected errors without leaked error position by
τ1(ǫ) ≤


log
(
1 + 6ǫ− 10ǫ2) for ǫ ≤ 1/4
log
(
3
2 + 2ǫ− 2ǫ2
)
for 1/4 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2
1 for 1/2 ≤ ǫ
, (63)
and for corrected errors with leaked error positions by
τ1(ǫ) ≤
{
log
(
1 + 4ǫ− 4ǫ2) for ǫ ≤ 1/2
1 for 1/2 ≤ ǫ . (64)
The results for τ1 are shown in figure 2 and 3 respectively. It should be noted again, that the value of the disturbance
parameter changes depending on the intention to correct the errors. For other detector models these results hold as
well as long as we can show that for them the condition ǫ(n) ≥ 1/2 for n ≥ 2 holds. This condition can be readily
satisfied if p
(n)
D /p
(n)
rec ≥ µ for some µ > 0 and n ≥ 2 by choosing wd = 1/(2µ). For experiments with negligible numbers
of ambiguous results we can approximate the disturbance ǫ by a function of e = perr
psif
as the traditional error rate in
the sifted key. In the case of discarding errors this approximation is ǫ ≈ e1−e while for corrected keys it is ǫ ≈ e.
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FIG. 2. The fraction τ1 has to be discarded during privacy amplification as a function of the disturbance per correctly
received element of the generalized sifted key if errors are discarded. This result is a sharp estimate in the sense that Eve can
reach the level of collision probability on which the estimate is based.
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FIG. 3. The fraction τ1 has to be discarded during privacy amplification as a function of the disturbance per element of
the generalized sifted key if one corrects errors. If no information about the position of errors leaked to the eavesdropper, we
find for τ1 the dash-dotted curve, for leaked error positions we find the solid curve.
Since we can not give an estimate for ǫ from measured quantities the case of discarded errors, we concentrate on
reconciliation methods which correct errors. From the results of this section we see that this is the better methods
anyway, since discarding errors leads to a smaller nrec than correcting errors. This number would have to be reduced
further during privacy amplification than in the case of corrected errors, as can be seen by comparison of the estimates
for τ1 as a function of e. Therefore the final key will be shorter and with that the protocol less efficient.
From the estimates we find that the direct estimate for τ1 gives higher values if the information about error positions
has not leaked to the eavesdropper during reconciliation. We can regard the information of error positions as spoiling
information [7] and thus use the estimate (64) even in the case of uni-lateral error correction. Spoiling information
is any information which increases Eve’s Shannon information but decreases her expected collision probability on the
key leading to a decreased value of τ1. We conclude that from the point of privacy amplification and reconciliation,
the best known way to give a high rate of secure bits would be to use bi-lateral reconciliation methods.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF KEY GROWING
The process of quantum key growing depends on physical parameters and on the security parameters of the final
key. In this section we will bring together the essential formulas about the security statements concerning an accepted
key and about the average key growing rate we can expect. This analysis is presented only for error correction
reconciliation methods.
A. Security needs
The first thing a potential user has to fix is the tolerated change of Shannon entropy ∆tol an eavesdropper might
obtain on the key without posing a security hazard to the application in mind. Since this limit can not be guaran-
teed with absolute certainty, the user has to limit the tolerated probability αtol that Eve’s knowledge exceeds ∆tol.
Authentication may fail to detect errors leaving Alice and Bob with a key neither safe nor shared. The tolerated
probability for this has to be specified as γtol.
Given Itol, αtol and γtol and having in view a particular physical implementation of the quantum channel, Alice
and Bob fix a value of the tolerated disturbance ǫmax and of the security bits nS used in privacy amplification, as
well as the length nsif of the sifted key and the number of secure bits Naut used for authentication such that for an
accepted key the security target set by Itol, αtol and γtol is met and that the rate of secure bits generated, given below,
is optimized.
B. Security statement
The following security statement holds if the key growing is performed by extracting a key of length
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nfin = nsif [1− τ1(ǫmax)]− nS (65)
from the reconciled key during privacy amplification. Here τ1 is given by by the functional dependence of equations
(63) and (64) respectively. From the previous calculations we find that the bits generated in a run of the key growing
process are secure in the sense that Eve achieves a change of Shannon entropy on the accepted key of less than ∆tol
with probability α. The contributions to α are the probability of failure of the estimation of the average disturbance
given by α1 in equation (14), the probability to estimate the Shannon information in a specific run from the average
information, given by α2 in equation (16) and the probability of faked authentication, given by α3 in equation (17).
Since all those quantities are expected to be small, the estimate
α ≤ α1 + α2 + α3 (66)
= exp(−2nsifδ2) + ln(2
−nS + 1)
∆tol
+ 2−Naut+1
≈ exp(−2nsifδ2) + 2
−nS
∆tol ln 2
+ 2−Naut+1
with δ = ǫmax − ǫmeas is sufficient for practical purposes.
The failure to establish a key in a specific run is due to the failure of authentication. Here two contributions can be
distinguished. One is the failure of reconciliation, which happens with probability β1, the other is the failure to reach
the target of αtol in that run, which is signaled by making the authentication fail. This happens with a probability
β2. In the design of the set-up and the choice of parameters we would need to estimate β so that at least in the
absence of an eavesdropper we will find a net gain of secure bits according to the formula given below. Miscalculation
of β does not affect the security of the key, it only affects the efficiency of key generation. We omit therefore detailed
examinations of values for β.
The last quantity concerning the security of the key is γ, which is the probability that authentication succeeds
although Alice and Bob do not share a key. This probability can be estimated by γ = 2−Naut+1.
C. Gain
In the previous subsection we described the influence of the chosen basic parameters on the acceptance and security of
a run of key growing. Since we need secret bits as an input for the key generation we have to make sure that on average
we will gain more secret bits than we put in. The important quantities are here the success probability psucc = 1− β
that a run of the key expansion leads to accepted new secure bits, the number Nout = nrec [1−τ1(ǫmax)]−nS of secret
bits gained in that instance and the average number N in = N rec +Naut of input secret bits. Then the condition for
an overall gain on average is to have a positive value of Ngain = psuccNout −N in resulting in
Ngain = (1− β) {nsif [1− τ1(ǫmax)]− nS} (67)
−Naut −Nrec .
To explore the implications of this condition we go to the limit of large sample sizes. Then we can neglect the number
of secret bits used for authentication and and the safety parameter nS. The remaining contribution of N in now comes
from the error correction part. For ideal error correction we can set β = 0 and can use the Shannon limit which gives
N in = nsif(1 − IAB(ǫmeas)) with the Shannon information shared between Alice and Bob given by
IAB(ǫmeas) = (68)
1 + ǫmeas log ǫmeas + (1− ǫmeas) log(1− ǫmeas) .
With these preparations we find
Ngain = nsif [1− τ1(ǫmeas)]− nsif(1 − IAB(ǫmeas)) .
In the limit of nsif → ∞ we can assume that δ → 0 still satisfies any confidence limits put on α. Therefore the
condition Ngain ≥ 0 is now equivalent to
IAB(ǫmeas) ≥ τ1(ǫmeas) . (69)
As we see from figure 4 this means that the protocol in the presented form will be able to grow secret keys only
for set-ups operating at an error rate of less than 11.5% for error correction. However, making use of the concept
20
of spoiling information and of improved estimates of p
(1)
c might result in lower estimates for τ1. A lower bound is,
however, the Shannon information IAE shared by Alice and Eve in this scenario. Fuchs et al. give in [15] a sharp
bound for IAE , which is shown in figure 4 as dotted line. The difference between τ1 and IAE represent the average
gain G in a run of the key growing protocol in the limit of ideal error correction and infinite sample sizes. The gain
G = IAB(ǫmeas)− τ1(ǫmeas) (70)
gives the length of the final key as a fraction of the generalized sifted key.
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FIG. 4. Shortening during privacy amplification, represented by τ1 (uni-lateral scenario in dash-dotted curve, bi-lateral
scenario as solid curve), in balance with the loss during reconciliation, represented by IAB (falling solid line). The intersections
between two lines limits the tolerable error rate in the generalized sifted key in the case of corrected errors. A lower limit of
potentially improved bounds for τ1 is IAE (dotted line).
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper I have given estimates needed in quantum cryptography which are closely oriented towards practical
experiments. I do not deal with security against all possible attacks in quantum mechanics, but I deal with all attacks
on individual signals. This allows me to include issues related to practical implementation of quantum cryptography
which still can not be treated in the general scenario. One of these issues is the question of signals which, for example,
triggered simultaneously two detectors monitoring orthogonal polarization modes. (This is the question of multi-
photon signals resent by Eve, leading to ambiguous signals.) The other important question is that of an efficient key
reconciliation prior to privacy amplification. As seen in this paper it is possible to use the efficient bi-lateral error
correction scheme of Brassard and Salvail [14] without compromising security.
In the statistical analysis I showed that it is possible to limit in this scenario the knowledge of the eavesdropper
on the final key in a individual realization from measured quantities for parameters which seem to be reachable in
experiments. As measure of the eavesdropper’s knowledge I used the change between a-priori and a-posteriori Shannon
entropy associated with the corresponding probability distributions over all possible keys from Eve’s point of view.
One has to take into account that single photon signals states are not used in today’s experiments. However, this
theory can be extended to signal states containing multi-photon components. A first approach for that is to estimate
pxc = 1 for each bit of the reconciled key on which Eve could have performed successfully a splitting operation with
subsequent delayed measurement. Denote by nm the total number of these bits, then we need to reduce the key
during privacy amplification by
τ
(mult)
1 (ǫ) =
nm
nrec
+
(
1− nm
nrec
)
τ1
(
ǫ
nrec
nrec − nm
)
. (71)
The statistics, however, becomes more complicated this way and it seems to be better to include the dim coherent
states directly as signal states and to solve the problem in a clean way. Work in that direction is currently under
progress.
The estimates for τ1 are not necessarily sharp in the case of error correction, and even in the case of discarding
errors this limit could be lowered using spoiling information [7]. However, the possible improvement of efficiency of
the key growing process is limited and this fine-tuning might be postponed until the experimental relevant situation
for dim coherent signal states is solved.
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APPENDIX A: CAUCHY INEQUALITY
In this appendix we prove the inequality (48) starting from the expression
p(1)c =
1
8p
(1)
rec
∑
k∈K(1)
(Ak00)
4 + (Ak11)
4
(Ak00)
2 + (Ak11)
2
(A1)
+
1
8p
(1)
rec
∑
k′∈K′(1)
(B˜k
′
00)
4 + (B˜k
′
11)
4
(B˜k
′
00)
2 + (B˜k
′
11)
2
.
We rewrite the first sum as
∑
k
(
(Ak00)
2 + (Ak11)
2 − 2
(
Ak00A
k
11
)2
(Ak00)
2 + (Ak11)
2
)
(A2)
and use the Cauchy inequality, given as
(∑
k
xkyk
)2
≤
(∑
k
x2k
)(∑
k
y2k
)
(A3)
or
∑
k
x2k ≥
(
∑
k xkyk)
2∑
k y
2
k .
(A4)
We set xk =
(Ak00A
k
11)√
(Ak00)
2+(Ak11)
2
and yk =
√
(Ak00)
2 + (Ak11)
2 to obtain the inequality
∑
k
(Ak00)
4 + (Ak11)
4
(Ak00)
2 + (Ak11)
2
≤ (A5)
∑
k
(
(Ak00)
2 + (Ak11)
2
)− 2
(∑
k A
k
00A
k
11
)2∑
k(A
k
00)
2 + (Ak11)
2
.
This can be used to estimate the first part in (A1) while the second part can be estimated similarly so that, with the
help of eqn. (46), we find the result
p(1)c ≤ 1 (A6)
− 1
4prec
(A00A11)
2
|A00|2 + |A11|2 −
1
4prec
(
B˜00B˜11
)2
|B˜00|2 + |B˜11|2
.
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APPENDIX B: MAXIMIZING P
(1)
C
FOR DISCARDED ERRORS
To optimize the expression (48) we first note that we can assume that |A00| = |A11|. If Eve starts with a strategy
defined by operators Ak not satisfying this condition, then she could use the A-operators Ak =
(
0 1
1 0
)
Ak
(
0 1
1 0
)
without a change in the obtained collision probability or disturbance. When we combine the two strategies we find that
the resulting vectors satisfy |A00| = |A11| and |A01| = |A10|. This then gives the estimate |A01 +A10|2 ≤ 4|A01|2.
Another observation is that we can always choose |A00| + |A11| ≥ |B˜00| + |B˜11| which means that there are less or
equal errors in the sifted key coming from the use of the polarization basis ’+’ than from the basis ’×’. This can be
always satisfied, since both polarization basis could be interchanged. Using |A00| = |A11| and the definition of |B˜00|
and |B˜11| this results in 2|A00|2(1− cosφ1100) ≥ |A01 +A10|2 with the angle φ1100 between A00 and A11.
The three relevant relations now become after elimination of p
(1)
rec according to (36) and the use of the relations (42)
p(1)c ≤ 1−
(1 + ǫ(1))|A00|2(cosφ1100)2
8psif
− (1 + ǫ
(1))
(
2|A00|2(1 + cosφ1100)− |A01 +A10|2
)2
32psif (2|A00|2(1 + cosφ1100) + |A01 +A10|2)
(B1)
psif
(1 + ǫ(1))
=
1
8
(
|A00|2(3 + cosφ1100) +
1
2
|A01 +A10|2
)
(B2)
psif =
1
2
(|A00|2 + |A01|2) (B3)
Our next step is to show that we can estimate the optimal value of p
(1)
c by replacing |A01 +A10|2 by 4|A01|2. To see
that we observe that this would allow to decrease (1 + ǫ(1)) by eqn (B2), meaning a lower error rate. At the same
time p
(1)
c grows indirectly from the falling value of (1 + ǫ(1)) and directly, since
d
dD
p
(1)
c ≥ 0 with D := |A01 +A10|2.
To prove the last point we calculate
d
dD
p(1)c =
(1 + ǫ(1))A
32psif (2|A00|2 +D + 2|A00|2 cosφ1100)2
(B4)
A = 12|A00|4 − 4|A00|2D −D2 + 24|A00|4 cosφ1100 − 4|A00|2D cosφ1100 + 12|A00|4(cosφ1100)2 . (B5)
This is positive, if A is positive. This is, indeed, the case since
d
dD
A = −4|A00|2 − 2D − 4|A00|2 cosφ1100 ≤ 0 (B6)
allows us to evaluate A at the maximal value of Dmax = 2|A00|2(1 − cosφ1100) where it gives zero. This proves that
A ≥ 0 and with that d
dD
p
(1)
c ≥ 0. Therefore, three relevant equations become
p(1)c ≤ 1−
(1 + ǫ(1))|A00|2(cosφ1100)2
8psif
− (1 + ǫ
(1))
(|A00|2(1 + cosφ1100)− 2|A01|2)2
16psif (|A00|2(1 + cosφ1100) + 2|A01|2)
(B7)
psif
(1 + ǫ(1))
=
1
8
(|A00|2(3 + cosφ1100) + 2|A01|2) (B8)
psif =
1
2
(|A00|2 + |A01|2) (B9)
We solve (B8) and (B9) for |A01| and cosφ1100 and insert these into (B7). The maximum over |A00| is then taken and
we find
p(1)c ≤
1
2
(
1 + 4ǫ(1) − 4
(
ǫ(1)
)2)
. (B10)
The strategy resulting in this collision probability is described by
|A00|2 = |A11|2 = 2psif
1 + ǫ(1)
(B11)
|A01|2 = |A10|2 = 2psifǫ
(1)
1 + ǫ(1)
(B12)
cosφ1100 = 1− 2ǫ(1) (B13)
cosφ1001 = 1 . (B14)
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In the derivation we have chosen 2|A00|2(1−cosφ1100) ≥ |A01+A10|2 and find the optimal solution respects this choice
for ǫ(1) ≤ 12 . For ǫ(1) = 12 we find p
(1)
c = 1 so that we conclude that
p(1)c ≤
{
1
2
(
1 + 4ǫ(1) − 4 (ǫ(1))2) for ǫ(1) ≤ 1/2
1 for ǫ(1) ≥ 1/2
. (B15)
APPENDIX C: MAXIMIZING P
(1)
C
FOR CORRECTED ERRORS
We start from equation (51) and use the Cauchy inequality in a similar way as in appendix B. We obtain the bound
p(1)c ≤ 1−
(A00A10)
2 + (A00A11)
2 + (A01A10)
2 + (A01A11)
2(
|A00|2 + |A01|2 + |A10|2 + |A11|2
)2 (C1)
−
(
B˜00B˜10
)2
+
(
B˜00B˜11
)2
+
(
B˜01B˜10
)2
+
(
B˜01B˜11
)2
(∣∣∣B˜00∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣B˜01∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣B˜10∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣B˜11∣∣∣2
)2 .
Next we introduce the angles ϕ1100, ϕ
10
00, ϕ
10
01 between the corresponding vectors A00,A10,A01,A11, make use of the
relations (42) and (43), use the symmetry argument as in appendix B and find after some transformation the set of
equations
p(1)c ≤
3
4
(C2)
+
|A00|4 (1− 3 cos2 ϕ1100) + |A01|4 (1− 3 cos2 ϕ1001)
8(|A00|2 + |A01|2)2
+ |A00|2 |A01|2 3 + cosϕ
11
00 cosϕ
10
01 − 2 cos2 ϕ1000
4(|A00|2 + |A01|2)2
ǫ(1) =
|A00|2 (1− cosϕ1100) + |A01|2 (3 − cosϕ1001)
4(|A00|2 + |A01|2)
(C3)
The first observation is that it is optimal to choose cosϕ1000 = 0 since this choice optimizes p
(1)
c while it leaves ǫ(1)
unchanged. The second observation is that the choice of
|A00|2 cosϕ1100 = |A01|2 cosϕ1001 (C4)
within the subspace defined by
|A00|2 cosϕ1100 + |A01|2 cosϕ1001 = const
and fixed values of |A00| and |A01| is optimal if this choice is possible. In this case we are left with the equations
p(1)c ≤
3
4
(C5)
+
|A00|4 (1− 4 cos2 ϕ1100) + |A01|4 + 6 |A00|2 |A01|2
8(|A00|2 + |A01|2)2
ǫ(1) =
|A00|2 (1− 2 cosϕ1100) + 3 |A01|2
4(|A00|2 + |A01|2)
. (C6)
At the end of a short maximization calculation we find a solution consistent with symmetry condition (C4) for
1
4 ≤ ǫ(1) ≤ 12 . It is given by
p(1)c ≤
3
4
+ ǫ(1) −
(
ǫ(1)
)2
. (C7)
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This maximum is obtained by choosing the values cosϕ1100 =
1−2ǫ(1)
2(1−ǫ(1))
and |A01| = |A00|
√
ǫ(1)
1−ǫ(1)
. The symmetry
condition (C4) then gives cosϕ1001 =
1−2ǫ(1)
2ǫ(1)
which limits the range of validity to 14 ≤ ǫ(1). For 14 ≥ ǫ(1) we find the
optimal solution by selecting cosϕ1001 = 1. A short maximization calculation then gives the bound
p(1)c ≤
1
2
+ 3ǫ(1) − 5
(
ǫ(1)
)2
(C8)
for the choice of parameters cosϕ1100 =
1−3ǫ(1)
1−ǫ(1)
and |A01| = |A00|
√
ǫ(1)
1−ǫ(1)
.
APPENDIX D: MAXIMIZING P
(1)
C
FOR CORRECTED ERRORS WITH LEAKED ERROR POSITIONS
We apply Cauchy inequalities to equation (56) and use the vector notations A, B˜, C, and D˜ to find
p(1)c ≤ 1 (D1)
− 1
4psif
|A00A11|2
|A00|2 + |A11|2 −
1
4psif
|C01C10|2
|C01|2 + |C10|2
− 1
4psif
∣∣∣B˜00B˜11∣∣∣2
|B˜00|2 + |B˜11|2
− 1
4psif
∣∣∣D˜01D˜10∣∣∣2
|D˜01|2 + |D˜10|2
.
It becomes clear immediately that we can replace C by A and D˜ by B˜ because of relations similar to (43). Similar
to the calculations in appendices B and C we introduce the angles ϕ1100, ϕ
10
00, ϕ
10
01 and use the relations (42) and (43)
and the symmetry argument introduced in appendix B to find the new form of (D1) as
p(1)c ≤
3
4
− |A00|
2 cos2 ϕ1100 + |A01|2 cos2 ϕ1001
4(|A00|2 + |A01|2) (D2)
+
|A00|2|A01|2
2(|A00|2 + |A01|2)
[
(1 + cosϕ1100)(1 + cosϕ
10
01)
|A00|2(1 + cosϕ1100) + |A01|2(1 + cosϕ1001)
+
(1− cosϕ1100)(1− cosϕ1001)
|A00|2(1− cosϕ1100) + |A01|2(1− cosϕ1001)
]
while we take from appendix C the expression for ǫ(1) as
ǫ(1) =
|A00|2 (1− cosϕ1100) + |A01|2 (3 − cosϕ1001)
4(|A00|2 + |A01|2)
. (D3)
We next perform a variation along the path defined by |A00|2 cosϕ1100 + |A01|2 cosϕ1001 = const and find that p(1)c
is optimized for the choice cosϕ1100 = cosϕ
10
01. An optimization calculation for the remaining parameters leads to the
estimate
p(1)c ≤
1
2
+ 2ǫ(1) − 2
(
ǫ(1)
)2
(D4)
for a disturbance ǫ(1) ≤ 1/2. This optimum is obtained by choosing cosϕ1100 = 1− 2ǫ(1) and |A00| = |A01|
√
1−ǫ(1)
ǫ(1)
.
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